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Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg: Change in a
Minority Shareholder's Right to the Truth?
I. INTRODUCTION
Doris Sandberg held stock in a bank. Her stock, along with other
minority shareholders' stock, comprised fifteen percent of the bank stock.
A holding company owned the remaining eighty-five percent of the
shares. When the directors of the bank solicited Sandberg's proxy for
a proposed merger with another bank, Sandberg balked at the cash
price offered for her shares. Sandberg thought the price offered to be
something other than "fair" as it was described in the proxy solicitation.
She filed suit in federal district court alleging breaches of fiduciary duties
and violations of federal securities law by the directors, and at the
conclusion of the trial, the jury held in favor of Sandberg. Rule 14a-
9,' promulgated under the authority of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, prohibits proxy solicitations through the use of false or misleading
statements, and the Supreme Court has implied a private right of action
for violations of Rule 14a-9. 2
The United States Supreme Court held that although the statements
were inaccurate and misleading and could have swayed Sandberg's vote
to favor the merger, her position as a minority shareholder in light of
the eighty-five percent ownership by the majority shareholder resulted
in no causation of damages. The Court refused to provide a federal
remedy to a shareholder who had received proxy solicitations that con-
tained false and misleading information in direct violation of Rule 14a-
9. The Court directed Sandberg, instead, to her state remedies under
Virginia corporation law. These state remedies minimally protect minority
shareholders and are certainly less protective than the federal remedy
Sandberg assumed she had.
The purpose of this casenote is to characterize the history and future
of Rule 14a-9 litigation through an analysis of Virginia Bankshares, Inc.
v. Sandberg.' This characterization begins with a history of 14a-9 liti-
Copyright 1992, by LouisiANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9, (1991).
2. J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S. Ct. 1555 (1964).
3. I11 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
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gation, followed by the facts and holding of Virginia Bankshares. Finally,
typical state remedies available to shareholders in Sandberg's position
are presented as well as possible solutions to the perplexing result of
Virginia Bankshares.
I. RULE 14A-9.
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt rules concerning
the solicitation of proxies and prohibits the violation of those rules.4
The SEC implemented Rule 14a-9 to thwart the solicitation of proxies
by means of false or misleading statements.' The Supreme Court first
recognized a private right of action for violation of Rule 14a-9 in J.
I. Case Company v. Borak.6 The Borak Court reviewed the history of
Rule 14a-9 and concluded that private litigation would insure compliance.
The Court stated:
Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary
supplement to Commission action. As in anti-trust treble damage
litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief
serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of. the
proxy requirements .... We, therefore, believe that under the
circumstances here it is the duty of the courts to be alert to
provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the
congressional purpose.'
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988)[Section 14(a)] provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit
the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect
of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section
781 of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
5. This rule is found in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1991) and provides in part:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement . ;. containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of
the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect
to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in
order to make the statements therein not false or misleading ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1991).
6. 377 U.S. 426, 84 S. Ct. 1555 (1964). For an overview of the elements of 14a-9
litigation, see William Painter, Civil Liability Under the Federal Proxy Rules, 64 Wash.
U. L.Q. 425 (1986); Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 477-486 (2d ed.
1988).
7. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432-33, 84 S. Ct. at 1560.
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The Court further stated that the federal action in no way impinged
upon any remedies available under state law.
Six years later the Court further defined the private right of action
recognized by the Borak Court in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Company.'
The plaintiff in Mills was a shareholder of Electric Auto-Lite which
merged with Mergenthaler Linotype Company. The proxy solicitation,
which recommended the merger, failed to disclose that all of the Electric
Auto-Lite directors proposing the merger had been nominated to their
positions by Mergenthaler.9 In order to maintain a 14a-9 action, the
plaintiff must show that the misstatements or omissions were material.
In Mills, some minority shareholder votes were required for approval
of the merger. Thus, the Court was faced with the question of whether
the omissions were material.
The Mills Court defined material misstatements or omissions to be
those where "the defect was of such a character that it might have
been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the
process of deciding how to vote."' 0 In a footnote, the Court commented
upon the necessity for shareholders to make informed decisions and
attached little importance to whether or not the shareholder would have
voted differently if he or she had been informed. After determining the
omitted information was material, the court analyzed the causation issue.
The Mills Court refused to hold that causation required proof that
the defect had an actual effect on the voting. Instead, the Court adopted
an "essential link" test." Thus, if the proxy solicitation was an essential
link in the merger, and the solicitation contained material misstatements
or omissions, then the plaintiff has shown sufficient causation of dam-
ages. This test avoids the problematical case in which shareholders do
not have sufficient votes to affect the outcome of the vote. "
8. 396 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 616 (1970).
9. Mergenthaler owned over 50% of the outstanding shares of Auto-Lite common
stock. See id. at 378, 90 S. Ct. at 618.
10. Id. at 384, 90 S. Ct. at 621.
11. "Where there has been a showing of materiality, a shareholder has made a
sufficient showing of a causal relationship between the violation and the injury for which
he seeks redress if, as here, he proves that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the
particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment
of the transaction." Mills, 396 U.S. at 385, 90 S. Ct. at 622.
12. This was recognized by the Court, which stated:
We need not decide in this case whether causation could be shown where the
management controls a sufficient number of shares to approve the transaction
without any votes from the minority. Even in that situation, if the management
finds it necessary for legal or practical reasons to solicit proxies from minority
shareholders, at least one court has held that the proxy solicitation might be
sufficiently related to the merger to satisfy the causation requirement.
Id. at 385 n.7, 90 S. Ct. at 622 n.7.
19921 1047
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
The issue of materiality was again raised in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc. 3 Prior to TSC, some courts had read Mills as holding
that the requirement for a showing of materiality was simply that a
reasonable shareholder might attach importance to a misrepresented
fact.' 4 The Court in TSC bluntly proclaimed this reading of Mills to
be "misplaced." 5 Recognizing that an unnecessarily low standard of
materiality would "[subject] the corporation and its management...
to liability for insignificant omissions or misstatements" or would result
in an "avalanche" of trivial information to shareholders,' 6 the standard
was restated: "An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote."' 7 This standard does not require proof that the
omitted information would have caused the reasonable investor to change
his vote, yet it is a higher standard than the "might have been considered
important" standard set forth in Mills.'" Thus, the basic requirements
for a 14a-9 action are: (1) materiality of the misstatements or omissions
and (2) causation of damages, as the Virginia Bankshares Court required
of Sandberg, and as shown in sections III and IV. These elements are
best explained in light of the facts of Virginia Bankshares.
III. FACTS OF THE CASE.
First American Bankshares, Incorporated (FABI), a bank holding
company, began a "freeze-out" merger of two banks in December,
1986.19 FABI used the merger as a tool to force minority shareholders
13. 426 U.S. 438, 96 S. Ct. 2126 (1976).
14. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1301-02 (2d Cir. 1973);
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603-04 (5th Cir. 1974); Thomas Hazen,
The Law of Securities Regulation 314-315 (Lawyer's Ed. 1985); Louis Loss, supra note
6, at 480-83.
15. TSC, 426 U.S. at 446, 96 S. Ct. at 2131. The Court noted that lower courts
had misread the Mills Court's use of the word "propensity" in describing the effect on
the voting process required to meet the materiality test. Id. at 447, 96 S. Ct. at 2131.
16. Id. at 448, 96 S. Ct. at 2132.
17. Id. at 449, 96 S. Ct. at 2132.
18. A simplistic comparison of the old and new standards would be "possibly would
have considered important" as opposed to "probably would have considered important."
It has been noted that this definition of materiality has been followed in other SEC
contexts such as Rule lOb-5. See Louis Loss, supra note 6, at 482 n.109 for a representative
list of such use. Some early 14a-9 cases required an element of scienter. Later cases have
used a negligence standard and Virginia Bankshares is a recent example which indicates
that the required elements for a successful 14a-9 action are materiality and causation.
19. A "freezeout" merger, as the term is used here, is accomplished by forcing
minority shareholders to accept cash in exchange for their shares through the use of a
merger. FABI gained 100%b0 control of the Bank as a result of the merger. For a thorough
explanation of freezeouts, see Victor Brudney & Marvin Chirelstein, A Restatement of
Corporate Freezeouts, 87 Yale L.J. 1354 (1978).
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to take cash for their shares. This put FABI in total control of both
banks. FABI completely owned one bank, Virginia Bankshares, Incor-
porated, and owned eighty-five percent of the shares of the other bank,
American Bank of Virginia (Bank). The remaining shares of the Bank
were owned by 2,000 minority shareholders. The minority shareholders
were to lose their interests in the Bank as a result of the merger. FABI
hired Keefe, Bruyette & Woods (KBW), an investment banking firm,
to determine the value of the minority interests. 0
KBW valued the stock at $42 per share. The proxy solicitation
included this price, describing $42 per share as being both a "high"
and a "fair" price for the stock. The generous price was touted as the
reason the directors had recommended the merger. Virginia corporation
law does not require such a proxy solicitation; the merger could have
been accomplished by a merger proposal submitted to a vote at a
shareholder meeting.2 Most minority shareholders gave the proxies re-
quested,22 and the merger was approved at the shareholder meeting on
April 21, 1987.
Doris Sandberg, a minority shareholder, disapproved of the merger
and filed suit in federal district court alleging that the proxies were
solicited in violation of both Rule 14a-911 and state law. She alleged
that the directors believed the price to be neither high nor fair and that
they were in favor of the merger only because it would allow them to
remain on the board.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Sandberg on both counts,
finding violations of Rule 14a-9 and a breach of fiduciary duties owed
by the bank's directors under state law. The court awarded Sandberg
the difference between the "fair" price of the shares and what she had
actually received. 4
20. The bank did not hire an independent agency to value the stock. KBW provided
the only valuation of the stock and they were employed by FABI. KBW's fee was contingent
on the success of the merger; a successful merger would result in the firm netting $75,000
in addition to its initial fee of $25,000. Not surprisingly, KBW suggested a "fair" value
of $42, which was the same amount Jack Beddow, an officer of both FABI and the
bank, had suggested to KBW as a fair price. Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 891
F.2d 1112, 1117 (4th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter the Court of Appeals decision is referred to
as Sandberg).
21. Va. Code Ann. §§ 13.1-716 et. seq. (Michie Supp. 1991).
22. Approximately 850 of the minority shareholders approved of the merger by
proxy. See Sandberg, 891 F.2d at 1117.
23. SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R 240.14a-9 (1991). See supra note 5.
24. Sandberg owned 22,442 shares at the time of the merger and was awarded $18
per share in damages from FABI on the Rule 14a-9 claim. See Sandberg, 891 F.2d al
1117.
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
district court. 5 FABI applied for certiorari and writs were granted. 6
The Court considered two issues: 1) Were the statements in the proxy
solicitation actionable, i.e. were they "material" misstatements?; and 2)
Was there sufficient proof of causation of damages?
The Court held statements of opinions to be similar to statements
of fact and therefore actionable. The Court also held the minority
shareholders to lack the requisite proof of causation of damage because
the minority shareholders could not have changed the outcome of the
merger vote with their collective proxy vote. In facing the issue of
materiality, the Court first had to decide if statements such as those
made by the directors of their "beliefs" could be material under Rule
14a-9.
IV. REASONS, OPINIONS, AND BELIEFS AS ACTIONABLE MISSTATEMENTS
The proxy solicitation contained statements alleged to have been
misleading. 2' The directors of the Bank were required by both federal
and state law to disclose their recommendations and reasons for the
merger." The Court first faced the threshold issue of whether or not
reasons, opinions and beliefs could be actionable per se. These subjective
statements "on the speaker's mind"2 9 are conscious expressions of beliefs
which the speaker may know to be untrue. The Court viewed the question
of whether statements of reason, opinions or, beliefs are actionable as
a basic legal question. 30
The proper inquiry involves not the type of statement made but
rather whether or not the statement is material under the guidelines
25. Sandberg, 891 F.2d at 1112.
26. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 110 S. Ct. 1921 (1990).
27. There was dispute between the parties concerning what information the ideal
proxy would contain. The Supreme Court analyzed the assertion that "(t]he Plan of
Merger has been approved by the Board of Directors because it provides an opportunity
for the Bank's public shareholders to achieve a high value for their shares." Virginia
Bankshares, Ill S. Ct. at 2756.
The "independence" of KBW was questioned and Sandberg alleged the following
omissions/misstatements in the proxy solicitation: (1) failure to disclose that VBI had the
voting power to elect members of the bank's board; (2) a statement that the recommended
price had been negotiated; (3) failure to reveal the value of bank holdings, which would
have shown the value of the stock to be greater than $42; and (4) failure to disclose that
Paul Beddow was an officer of the bank as well as an officer of FABI. Sandberg v.
Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 891 F.2d 1112, 1122 n.3 (1989).
28. This was noted by the Sandberg Court. See Sandberg, 891 F.2d at 1121 (citing
Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-718(B)(1) and 12 C.I.R. § 335.212).
29. Virginia Bankshares, III S. Ct. at 2757.
30. "That such statements may be materially significant raises no significant question."
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established in TSC, i.e., whether or not there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider the misstated or omitted
information important in deciding how to vote. As the Court stated:
"We think there is no room to deny that a statement of belief by
corporate directors about a recommended course of action, or an ex-
planation of their reasons for recommending it, can take on just that
importance."'" The Court made this point by referring to the under-
pinning fiduciary duties usually imposed on corporate directors by state
law. 2 These duties create an atmosphere of confidence in which share-
holders are reasonable in relying on information provided by the more
knowledgeable directors. Statements that the directors believe the merger
price to be fair will be relied on by shareholders who are not in a
position to question these statements based on the knowledge they have.
VBI raised the question of whether or not the Court intended to
probe the mental state of a defendant to determine his subjective beliefs
by comparing the defendant to the plaintiff in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,"3 a Rule 10b-514 case. As the Court correctly sur-
mised, the issue in Blue Chip Stamps was of a different genus. In short,
the plaintiff had been discouraged from purchasing stock in Blue Chip
Stamps because the prospectus offered a gloomy self-portrayal of the
company's future. The plaintiff was seeking damages for lost oppor-
tunity, as well as a chance to purchase the stock at the original offering
price and punitive damages. In order to limit potential litigation, the
Court used the plain language of lOb-5 to limit the class of possible
plaintiffs to actual buyers and sellers of the stock. The alternative would
have been to allow courts to determine when plaintiffs might have
purchased and sold the stock as well as the volume involved in the
transaction- relegating courts to the determination of "hazy issues." 5
These speculative claims would result in an administrative nightmare for
courts. The class of plaintiffs would consist of all who had considered
purchasing the stock.
These determinations of purchase dates and amounts, for all practical
purposes, are completely subjective and, therefore, unlike the statements
of corporate directors contained in a proxy solicitation, which have an
element of objectivity. Statements involving objective facts concerning
the value of corporate stock are "characteristically matters of corporate
31. Id. at 2757.
32. Of course it is incongruous that Sandberg and other shareholders in her position
had no state remedy, as noted by the Court. Id. at 2766.
33. 421 U.S. 723, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
34. Rule lob-5 is more expansive and is a general prohibition against fraud in the
purchase or sale of securities, whereas 14a-9 regulates only proxy solicitations involving
registered securities.
35. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 743, 95 S. Ct. at 1929.
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record subject to documentation, to be supported or attacked by evidence
of historical fact outside a plaintiff's control." 36 Proof will usually be
accessible to plaintiffs through discovery when the question is one of
dollar value and the corporation involved is a bank." The words used
to describe the proposed value of the stock-"high" and "fair"-are
subject to valuation to a certain extent." As the Court noted, evidence
of this type is not subject to manufacture by plaintiffs since it will be
in the hands of defendants. 9 Courts will be required to determine the
subjective intents and motives of directors. These directors stated their
motive for support of the merger to be the fair price offered when
subjectively they may have been concerned with the future of their
positions as directors.
(These statements] can be uttered with knowledge of truth or
falsity just like more definite statements, and defended or at-
tacked through the orthodox evidentiary process that either sub-
stantiates their underlying justifications or tends to disprove their
existence. . . .However conclusory the directors' statement may
have been, then, it was open to attack by garden-variety evidence,
subject neither to a plaintiff's control nor ready manufacture,
and there was no undue risk of open-ended liability or uncon-
trollable litigation in allowing respondents the opportunity for
recovery on the allegation that it Was misleading to call $42
,,high.,,40
Thus, the inquiry is not limited to a probe of the psyche. Findings of
fact can be based on corporate records and other objective evidence.
VBI also put forth the argument that the "total mix" of the so-
licitation may not have been misleading. 4 1 VBI suggested that the mis-
statements were only a part of the solicitation, and, considered in its
entirety, the solicitation was not misleading. But "not every mixture
with the true will neutralize the deceptive." '4  Proxy solicitations are
36. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, Il1 S. Ct. 2749, 2758 (1991).
37. Id.
38. For some of the controversial issues in post-merger stock valuation see Hideki
Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32
UCLA L. Rev. 429 (1985); Lynn Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market
Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 Yale L.J. 1235, 1284 (1990).
39. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. IIl S. Ct. at 2758. The jury found that a fair price
for the stock was $60 per share, indicating that a basis for valuation of the price as
"high" exists.
40. Id. at 2758-59.
41. This terminology originated in Smallwood Brewing v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489
F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S. Ct. 134 (1974).
42. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, IIl S. Ct. 2749, 2760 (1991).
1052 [Vol. 52
NOTES
intended to allow the investor to make an informed decision; the purpose
is not to challenge-the wits of the reader." As noted by the Court, the
positions of the directors and shareholders and their "perceived supe-
riority [are] magnified even further by the common knowledge that state
law customarily obliges them to exercise their judgment in the share-
holders' interest."** This leaves shareholders at the mercy of directors
because of the superior knowledge of the directors.
In sum, the Court held that vague words such as "high" and "fair",
even though statements of belief, may be material misstatements. The
inquiry concerns the impact of the statements on the investor's voting
decision. Statements, such as those under scrutiny here, which purport
to reflect the reasons for director support of a proposed merger are
subject to reception by shareholders because of reliance on the fiduciary
relationship between the parties. This increases the potential for a finding
that such statements are material. After a showing of materiality, the
plaintiff is next confronted with the hurdle of damage causation.
V. CAUSATION OF DAMAGES
After finding the misstatements to be material, the second issue as
stated by the Court "is whether causation of damages compensable
through the implied right of action under § 14(a) can be demonstrated
by a member of a class of minority shareholders whose votes are not
required by law or corporate bylaw to authorize the transaction giving
rise to the claim." '4 That is, could Sandberg show that the misstatements
caused damage if her vote did not count?
The holding of Mills, as interpreted by the Virginia Bankshares
Court, is:
[Clausation of damages by a material proxy misstatement could
be established by showing that minority proxies necessary and
sufficient to authorize the corporate acts had been given in
accordance with the tenor of the solicitation, and the Court
described such a causal relationship by calling the proxy solic-
itation an "essential link in the accomplishment of the trans-
action. " 46
43. Id. at 2761.
44. Id. at 2757.
45. Id. at 2761.
46. Id. at 2762 (emphasis added). The Court here misinterpreted Mills slightly. The
Mills Court exlressly reserved the issue, as in Virginia Bankshares, where management
controls sufficient shares to approve the transaction without the vote of minority share-
holders who do not have the votes necessary and sufficient to authorize the corporate
acts. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 n.7, 90 S. Ct. 616, 622 n.7.
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In the instant case, the majority depicted Sandberg as a member of a
class "without votes required by law or by-law [sic] to authorize the
action proposed." '47 Sandberg was not a member of a class of minority
shareholders "necessary and sufficient" to approve the merger. The
Court, therefore, concluded that Sandberg had not shown that the
misstatements and omissions damaged her and that she was not entitled
to protection under Rule 14a-9. The minority shareholders' votes may
have been necessary from a practical, if not a legal, point of view; if
the votes were not necessary, then why would the holding company risk
a suit such as this one by blundering the proxy solicitation? 8
Sandberg set forth two theories to show the existence of "essential
link" causation, as set forth in Mills. The first theory was based on
the Bank's motivation to avoid adverse public relations. Under this
theory, power would be wielded by minority shareholders not by virtue
of the corporate relationship but "from one party's apprehension of
the ill will of the other." 49 Thus, sufficient pressure from minority
shareholders who were opposed to the merger may have stopped the
merger. The second theory was based on underlying state law which
prevents attacks by minority shareholders if sufficient minority votes are
garnered. 0 Under this theory, so long as a sufficient number of minority
shareholders were persuaded to vote for the merger, the merger would
be protected from attack. The first theory generated more analysis by
the Court.
As noted by Justice Kennedy in dissent and as argued by Sandberg,
FABI or the Bank would likely have withdrawn or revised the merger
proposal had the proxy solicitation disclosed all the material facts. 1
FABI was interested in a smooth merger as evidenced by its solicitation
of proxies. The Court refused to acknowledge that human values, such
as the desire to avoid the ill will of shareholders, will often enter the
47. Virginia Bankshares, Ill S. Ct. at 2762 (using the language of the Mills Court),
48. See infra note 51.
49. Virginia Bankshares, Ill S.Ct. at 2762.
50. Id. at 2762-63.
51. Id. at 2771 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). It was alleged that FABI wanted a friendly
transaction, with a price the shareholders could not refuse. As noted:
Only a year or so before the Virginia merger, FABI had failed in an almost
identical transaction, an attempt to freeze out the minority shareholders of its
Maryland subsidiary. FABI retained Keefe, Bruyette & Woods (KBW) for that
transaction as well, and KBW had given-an opinion that FABI's price was fair.
The subsidiary's board of directors concluded that the price offered by FABI
was inadequate. [App] at 297,319. The Maryland transaction failed when the
directors of the Maryland bank refused to proceed; and this was despite the
minority's inability to outvote FABI if it had pressed on with the deal.
Id. at 2772.
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merger picture. It is not inconceivable that the merger would have
collapsed if most minority shareholders were properly informed and were
unwilling to accept the price considered fair by those who would gain
complete control by virtue of the merger. 2
One question remains: if $42 per share was not a fair price for the
bank's stock, then what remedy does Sandberg or any other minority
shareholder in her position have? The Court pointed to Sandberg's state
remedies."
VI. A CRITICISM: ARE STATE REMEDIES REALLY AN ALTERNATIVE?
Most states have adopted some form of "dissenter's rights" pro-
visions, generally similar to the provisions of the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act (RMBCA).54 Although a dissenter's rights vary across
jurisdictions, the steps involved in dissent, in a rough sense, are:
1) the shareholder notifies the corporation of his or her intent
to dissent and vote against the proposal,
2) the shareholder demands payment and tenders his or her
shares,
3) the corporation responds within 60 days with an offer of a
fair value of the shares,
4) the shareholder must respond to the corporation within 30
days,
5) if a fair price is not agreed upon, suit is filed and the court
appoints an appraiser, and
6) the loser must pay court expenses.
These remedies have been criticized because the "technicalities make
52. Id. at 2772.
53. The reticence of the Court to provide a federal remedy was foreshadowed in
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green:
Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize
the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions
in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation
would be overridden.
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479, 97 S. Ct. 1292, 1304 (1977)
(emphasis added). Justice Scalia's concurring opinion indicated his belief that the federal
cause of action under Rule 14a-9 was never enacted by Congress. See Virginia Bankshares,
III S. Ct. at 2767.
54. Third ed. (1990). For Sandberg's rights, see Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-730 (Michie
Supp. 1991). For a comparison see La. R.S. 12:131(A), (B) (Supp. 1991).
1992] 1055
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
[their] use difficult, expensive, and risky."" A shareholder must relin-
quish his or her shares and essentially resign to the inevitability of the
merger and the remedy of cash. Assuming that Sandberg complied with
these procedural provisions, she is entitled to receive a "fair" cash value
for her shares.
The determination of what is "fair" has been discussed by com-
mentators and various methods of valuation have been suggested. 6 The
trial court relied upon the testimony of an expert who used two methods
to calculate the fair value of Sandberg's shares and reached the same
result with both methods: the shares were worth $60 rather than the
$42 paid by FABI.17
Three credible goals or results of appraisal remedies have been
suggested: they may protect inframarginal valuations, i.e., shareholders
may undervalue stocks, they may result in management reckoning, and
they provide discovery procedures which may uncover wrongful behavior
of managers. 8 In general terms, the purpose of this remedy is to allow
shareholders to get out of a disagreeable situation without losing the
value of their investments in the process.
A conflict arises, though, in allowing shareholders to recoup the
amount equivalent to their perceived value of the stock. In the usual
case this will not be the corporation's perceived value of the stock.
Other problems exist. Some statutes provide an exception if the stock
is widely traded. The remedy is limited to the market value of the stock
on the day of the merger. This price may not reflect the true value of
the stock when almost all of the shares are owned by one shareholder.
This situation is not unlike that of Virginia Bankshares. In order
to gain complete control of the bank, FABI was required to purchase
only fifteen percent of the Bank's stock. There was no incentive for
them, or the directors under their control, to be certain the sales price
55. Revised Model Business Corporation Act, Chapter 13 Introductory Comment 1354
(1990). The Louisiana dissenter's rights provisions have rarely been litigated. See Armand
v. McCall, 570 So. 2d 158 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990). writ denied, 575 So. 2d 375 (1991)
(plaintiff forfeited right to assert derivative action by following dissenter's rights provision).
The Louisiana provision is found in La. R.S. 12:131 (Supp. 1991).
56. For a thorough discussion of various share valuation theories, see Lynn Stout,
supra note 38. Stout questions the appropriateness of theories based on a model of perfect
market elasticity. This is probative in Virginia Bankshares where the market was 85%
controlled by a single shareholder who made a successful attempt to force the remaining
shareholders to sell at a price determined by this majority shareholder to be "fair." See
also Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, supra note 38.
57. The first valuation method was the "dividend discount method." This method
is based on the projected future dividends which would be offered by the bank. The
second method utilized a comparison to other comparable banks in and around Virginia.
See Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 891 F.2d 1112, 1123 (4th Cir. 1989).
58. Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, supra note 38.
1056 [Vol. 52
reflected a true value. The market was not completely elastic because
of FABI's domination of the market in the bank's stock.5 9
It should become clear to the reader that state appraisal remedies
are something other than a panacea. 6° For Doris Sandberg, the remedy
would involve compliance with procedural deadlines of her state's dis-
senter's rights provisions as well as the placement of her shares in escrow
during the litigation. If it was determined that the price offered was
fair, she would have to pay court costs, either in part or in full,
depending on her state's statutes.6' The time has arrived for a recon-
sideration of the purpose and procedure of state shareholder appraisal
remedies. Virginia Bankshares relegates a class of plaintiffs to these
remedies who previously thought themselves protected by Rule 14a-9.12
Section VII provides some possible solutions to the ineffectiveness of
the state appraisal remedy.
VII. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
Congress has attempted to protect investors by enacting securities
regulations. There is no evidence that Congress in so doing intended to
exclude small investors from this protection. The Supreme Court has
limited the scope of federal securities law by limiting recovery for
violations to those with sufficient voting power to change the outcome
of a shareholder election. Shareholders are left with a limited state
remedy, and the remedy is not consistent among the states.
The Congress can correct this Court's interpretation of Rule 14a-9
by providing a statutory remedy for shareholders who are subjected to
misinformation in proxy solicitations. A statutory remedy should be
available for minority and majority shareholders. Congress has failed
to state in any terms what the remedy is for shareholders, leaving this
for interpretation by the Court, which may or may not reflect the intent
of Congress. Justice Scalia notes in his concurring opinion that Congress
59. Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore note that problems exist in their proposed appraisal
rationale in situations where the stock is thinly traded. Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore.
supra note 38, at 450-51.
60. Claims for state violations of fiduciary duties by corporate directors are another
possible remedy.
61. This views Sandberg as a generic plaintiff. Under Virginia law, Sandberg had no
appraisal remedy available. Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-43 (Michie 1988) specifically excludes
bank mergers from the usual appraisal remedy found in Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-730 (Michie
Supp. 1991). This was acknowledged by the majority in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, Ill S. Ct. 2749, 2766 n.14 (1991).
62. Since the Virginia Bankshares decision, at least one court has applied the Court's
logic to a Rule lOb-5 case. The court used the same loss causation test as that of Virginia
Bankshares and denied recovery to the plaintiff. See Booth v. Connelly Containers, Inc.,
1991 WL 171450, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12225 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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has provided no remedy for violations of Rule 14a-9 and that the Court
should not create such a remedy. Congress should amend the proxy
solicitation statutes and provide injunctive relief for minority shareholders
such as Sandberg. This would empower the courts to provide temporary
relief for minority shareholders as they attempt to muster their forces
to fight a proposed merger. As an alternative to this solution, Congress
or the SEC could enact penalties for violations of Rule 14a-9.
By providing a penalty for violations, corporations such as FABI
would be more reluctant to mislead minority shareholders. To be mean-
ingful, such penalties would have to be directly related to the dollar
amount gained by the deception. 6 Penalties of this type will not be
calculable without a standard system of valuing shares of stock. The
model of state dissenter's rights provisions seems unworkable for the
average minority shareholder. Congress should set up an administrative
procedure which would effectively handle many shareholder complaints.
A system o f this type would shoulder some of the burden traditionally
borne by courts, and would provide a standard system of stock valuation.
FABI was able to successfully mislead minority shareholders and in
so doing solicited enough proxies in favor of the merger to prevent a
later attack of the merger under Virginia state law. Actions like those
of FABI conflict with the basic reasons for having federal securities
laws, i.e., to protect investors who have little access to internal corporate
information and who should be able to rely on information provided
by those with superior information and knowledge. If a federal remedy
is not forthcoming, states must simplify dissenter's rights provisions.
State corporation laws purport to protect shareholders by providing
a statutory framework that guarantees a fair valuation of dissenting
shareholders' stock. These laws vary among states and they have failed
to protect shareholders, mainly due to the expense and intricacies of
dissenter's rights statutes. If states provide a simple and swift means to
adjudicate the fair value of shares, then any incentive to deceive minority
shareholders will be removed.
A simplification of stock valuation will assure minority shareholders
that their weakness in voting strength will not be abused. Directors may
undervalue stock in hopes that minority shareholders will take what is
63. As an example, see 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1988). This section of the air pollution
statutes provides that polluters may be forced to pay the amount of money they saved
by not installing required pollution reduction equipment. Problems have arisen in en-
forcement, though, which are instructive to enactors of securities -regulations. Conflicts
arise in valuing the actual savings, just as problems arise in determining the actual value
of shares in a merger. The provision of such a simplistic penalty does not mean that
enforcing the penalty will be as simple. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988)(liability to
contemporaneous traders for insider trading measured in terms of profit gained or loss
avoided).
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offered them. Most minority shareholders accepted the $42 offered in
Virginia Bankshares. The incentive for the directors to undervalue the
Bank's stock was great. The district court found. that the stock was
worth $60 per share, a savings by FABI of $18 per share on all shares
held by deceived shareholders. Even if forced to pay dissenting share-
holders the actual value of their shares, FABI still realized a substantial
benefit. Purchasers should not be able to deceive shareholders nor should
they be able to profit from deception.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Minority shareholders no longer have a federal remedy under Rule
14a-9 if they do not belong to a class of shareholders that has sufficient
votes to affect the outcome of an election in which proxies are solicited.
The Virginia Bankshares Court has held that not all violations of federal
securities law are actionable.
If the intent of the Court is to force more litigants into state court,
then state corporation laws will have to be restructured to allow dis-
senting shareholders access to a simple valuation procedure. If share-
holders can be forced to accept, cash for their shares, then the law
should guarantee them a fair price.
If the intent of the Court, alternatively, is to send a message to
minority shareholders that they should take what they are offered as a
fair price for their shares, then it is choosing to ignore the underlying
goal of federal securities laws, i.e., to protect investors from misinfor-
mation. This attitude would be contrary to the Supreme Court's usual
approach toward the protection of a disadvantaged group, especially
when the group is specifically protected under federal law. But, as stated
by Loss:
[Ilf it is "cricket" for the federal courts to invent new torts or
tort-like actions, it seems fair enough for them to invent rea-
sonable restrictions on the new actions as common law judges
a long time ago invented doctrines like materiality and scienter
and reliance and causation in order to achieve a sense of bal-
ance . 4
As Doris Sandberg has found, a rule which gives no indication of what
should be done with violators is of limited value.
Charles David Elliott
64. Louis Loss, supra note 6, at 955.
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